

David A. Miller

Curriculum Vitæ

Department of Economics, University of Michigan
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Tenure-track appointments

University of Michigan, Dept. of Economics: Associate Professor, 2017–present

University of Michigan, Dept. of Economics: Assistant Professor, 2013–2017

University of California, San Diego, Dept. of Economics: Assistant Professor, 2004–2013

Other positions

University of Michigan, Dept. of Economics: Director of Undergraduate Studies 2020–present

Microsoft Research New England, Cambridge, MA: Visiting Researcher, 2012–2013

Yale University, Dept. of Economics: Visiting Professor, 2008–2009

Tellus Institute, Risk Analysis Group, Boston, MA: Research Analyst, 1995–1998

Education

Stanford University: Ph.D. in Economics, June 2004

Harvard University: A.B. in Environmental Science and Public Policy, June 1995
Summa cum laude

Publications

“Communication and cooperation in markets”

With S. Nageeb Ali

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Forthcoming.

“Conservation agreements: Relational contracts with endogenous monitoring”

With Heidi Gjertsen, Theodore Groves, Eduard Niesten, Dale Squires, and Joel Watson

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Forthcoming.

“Relational contracting, negotiation, and external enforcement”

With Trond E. Olsen and Joel Watson

American Economic Review, 110(7): 2153–2197, July 2020.

“Ostracism and forgiveness”

With S. Nageeb Ali

American Economic Review, 106(8): 2329–2348, August 2016.

“Wasteful sanctions, underperformance, and endogenous supervision”

With Kareen Rozen

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(4): 326–361, November 2014.

“A theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining”

With Joel Watson

Econometrica, 81(6): 2303–2350, November 2013.

“Robust collusion with private information”

Review of Economic Studies, 79(2): 778–811, April 2012.

“Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry”

European Economic Review, 52(3): 387–412, April 2008.

“Was there too little entry during the Dot Com Era?”

With Brent Goldfarb and David Kirsch

Journal of Financial Economics, 86(1): 100–144, October 2007.

“Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations”

With Susan Athey

Theoretical Economics, 2(3): 299–354, September 2007.

“‘Token’ equilibria in sensor networks with multiple sponsors”

With Sameer Tilak and Tony Fountain

Proceedings of the Workshop on Stochasticity in Distributed Systems (StoDiS’05), San Jose, CA, December 19, 2005.

Working papers

“Seeking relationship support: Strategic network formation and robust cooperation”

With Xu Tan

Working paper, 2019.

“Renegotiation-proof multilateral enforcement”

With S. Nageeb Ali and David Yilin Yang

Working paper, 2018.

“When to behave badly and when to behave well under disagreement”

With Alexandra Charbi

Working paper, 2016.

“Enforcing cooperation in networked societies”

With S. Nageeb Ali

Working paper, 2013.

“Attainable payoffs in repeated games with interdependent private information”

Working paper no longer in development, 2009.

Fellowships, Grants, and Awards

Michigan Golden Apple Award Nominee, 2016, 2017

NSF Award SES–1127643, “Enforcing cooperation in networked societies” (Co-PI)

With S. Nageeb Ali (PI), 2011–2016 (\$289,401)

NET Institute Summer Grant (PI)

With Timothy Keller and Xiaohua (Anny) Wei (Co-PIs), 2010 (\$3,000)

Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Dissertation Fellowship, 2003–2004

Press citations

Kevin Lewis, “Teamwork,”

National Affairs Blog, May 8, 2016, <http://www.nationalaffairs.com/blog/detail/findings-a-daily-roundup/teamwork>

Leslie Berlin, “Lessons of survival from the Dot-Com attic,”

The New York Times, p. BU4, November 23, 2008, <http://nyti.ms/Mta9zq>

Leslie Taylor, “The dot-com bust? Not as bad as you think,”

Inc.com, December 4, 2006, <http://www.inc.com/news/articles/200612/bubble.html>

Lee Gomes, “The Dot-Com Bubble is reconsidered—and maybe relived,”

The Wall Street Journal, p. B1, November 8, 2006

Professional service

Organizing Committee, 2017 Midwest Workshop on Control and Game Theory

Organizing Committee, 2017 NSF/CEME Decentralization Conference

Excellence in Refereeing Award 2011, 2013, 2016 *American Economic Review*

Certificate of Exceptional Contribution in Reviewing 2015, *The Economic Journal*

Program Co-Chair, Fall 2013 Midwest Economic Theory Meetings

Certificate of Excellence in Reviewing 2013, *Games and Economic Behavior*

Panelist, NSF Interface between Computer Science and Economics & Social Sciences (ICES) Program

Referee: *Econometrica*; *American Economic Review*; *Review of Economic Studies*; *Theoretical Economics*; *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*; *Journal of Economic Theory*; *Games and Economic Behavior*.

American Economic Journal: Policy; *Berkeley Journals in Theoretical Economics*; *Ecological Economics*; *Economic Journal*; *Economics Letters*; *Economic Theory*; *International Economic Review*; *IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing*; *International Journal of Game Theory*; *International Journal of Industrial Organization*; *Journal of Conflict Resolution*; *Journal of Development Economics*; *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*; *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*; *Journal of the European Economic Association*; *Journal of Industrial Economics*; *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*; *Journal of Mathematical Economics*; *Journal of Public Economic Theory*; *Management Science*; *Operations Research*; *RAND Journal of Economics*; *Review of Economic Dynamics*.

Reviewer: NSF Economics Program, NSF Science of Science & Innovation Policy (SciSIP) Program

Presentations

“Seeking relationship support: Strategic network formation and robust cooperation”
2020: Queen’s University Smith School of Business; Universidad Carlos III (~~invited~~ canceled due to COVID-19); Universidad de Alicante (~~invited~~ canceled due to COVID-19). 2019: Penn State; Theoretical Research in Development Economics Conference, Notre Dame. 2018: Michigan Electrical Engineering & Computer Science; Workshop on Relational Contracts, University of Chicago; European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Cologne; Norwegian School of Economics. 2017: University of Zurich; Western Ontario; National University of Singapore; Chinese University of Hong Kong.

“Communication and cooperation in markets”
2020: Michigan. 2018: Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics, HEC Montréal.

“Relational contracting, negotiation, and external enforcement”
2018: Tulane. 2017: Michigan; University of Konstanz; Princeton; Penn State; North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, Chicago. 2016: Johns Hopkins Carey Business School; University of Washington; Kellogg School of Management; Shanghai Jiaotong University; Seoul National University; Workshop in Economic Theory, Cambridge INET Institute.

“Equilibrium selection in relational contracts”
2017: Penn State. 2016: Economic Theory Workshop, Seoul National University.

“Renegotiation-proof multilateral enforcement”
2016: World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Maastricht; NSF Conference on Network Science in Economics, Stanford; NSF/CEME Decentralization Conference, Brown. 2015: Michigan; Midwest Economic Theory Conference, Penn State.

“Ostracism and forgiveness”

2014: Arizona State; Ohio State. 2013: Michigan Socio-Technical Infrastructure for Electronic Transactions Program; Brown. 2012: Georgetown; North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, Chicago. 2011: Southern California Symposium on Network Economics and Game Theory, Los Angeles; Loyola Marymount; USC.

“Enforcing cooperation in networked societies”

2013: Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences; Boston College; Microsoft Research New England; Michigan; North Carolina. 2012: Michigan State; Northwestern; Arizona; Conference on Networks, Essex. 2011: UCSD Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering Dept.; UCLA Center for Engineering Economics, Learning, and Networks; North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, Washington University in St. Louis. 2010: Southern California Symposium on Network Economics and Game Theory, Los Angeles; NSF/CEME Decentralization Conference, Royal Irish Academy; Bocconi University; European University Institute. 2008: UCSD; Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics; Annual Meeting of the Society for Economic Dynamics, MIT; Georgetown; USC Marshall; Harvard/MIT; NYU Stern; Yale.

“A theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining”

2013: UMass-Amherst; Michigan. 2012: Boston University; Microsoft Research New England; Johns Hopkins; Washington University. 2011: Duke/Fuqua/UNC; North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, Denver. 2010: Collegio Carlo Alberto; UC Riverside. 2009: NBER Organizational Economics Working Group Meeting, Cambridge, Massachusetts; UCSD. 2008: UCSD; UCLA; Southwest Economic Theory Conference, UCSB; USC; Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Kellogg School of Management; Workshop on Recent Advances in Repeated Games, Stony Brook Game Theory Festival; Columbia; Western Ontario; Toronto.

“Modeling market power with repeated games”

2011: UCSD Osher Institute.

“Monitoring with collective memory: Forgiveness for optimally empty promises”

2010: Zurich. 2009: NSF/NBER/CEME Conference on General Equilibrium and Mathematical Economics, UCSD.

“A short course on repeated games”

2007: Sungkyunkwan University.

“Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations”

2006: Australasian Meetings of the Econometric Society, Alice Springs, Australia; Arizona State. 2005: UCSD; NBER/NSF Decentralization Conference, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

“Four lectures on repeated games with private information”

2006: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.

“Robust collusion with private information”

2006: University of Melbourne. 2005: Econometric Society World Congress, University College London; USC; UC Riverside; Caltech. 2004: UT Austin; UCSD; Northwestern; Kellogg School of Management; Michigan; Brown; Yale School of Management; Wisconsin; UCLA.

“Was there too little entry during the Dot Com Era?”

2006: UCSD.

“‘Token’ equilibria in sensor networks with multiple sponsors”

2005: Caltech SISL Workshop.

“Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry”

2005: International Industrial Organization Conference, Georgia Tech.

“Attainable payoffs in repeated games with private information”

2005: Southwest Economic Theory Conference, UC Riverside; Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics. 2004: UCSD.